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THE LEGAL FRAMEWORK FOR AQUIFER ISSUES
I. Introduction
A. Summary
The law of aquifer-stream relationships got off on the
wrong track. The standard pattern at first was for states to
adopt one legal doctrine for water in streams and a different one
for what was usually called percolating groundwater. The problem
with using two doctrines is that if a stream and groundwater are
sufficiently connected to constitute a single water supply,
serious coordination problems are unavoidable as water demands
increase. Many states still use two doctrines for physically
connected streams and aquifers, but most western states have now
opted for a single doctrine -- the appropriation doctrine.
Although a single doctrine is a major step forward, some complex
legal issues remain. These issues arise mainly from physical
differences between streamf low and groundwater -- specifically,
the slower, more diffuse, and less readily ascertainable movement
of groundwater.
Apart from aquifer-stream relationships, the recharge of
aquifers raises some interesting legal issues centering around
property rights. In most states, the courts and legislatures
have barely begun to address these issues.
This paper examines the major legal issues associated with
aquifer-stream relationships and with aquifer recharge.
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II. Aquifer/Stream Relationships 	 /Th
A. States With Separate Legal Doctrines
1. When one water law doctrine governs an aquifer and a
different one governs a physically connected stream, the question
arises of whether -- and if so, on what basis -- a water right in
"one" source will be protected against interference by the
exercise of a water right in the "other" source.
2. Many dual-doctrine states have no law on this question.
Where the question has been litigated, some courts have applied
the law of streams, which usually protects stream users over
groundwater users. Most of these cases involved high capacity
wells or wells located close to the stream. Other courts have
applied the law of percolating groundwater, which usually
benefits groundwater users at the expense of stream users. See
Davis, supra.
B. States With a Single Legal Doctrine: Prior Appropriation
1. The basic rule of the appropriation doctrine is that
first in time is first in right. This rule has long been applied
to allocate water among stream users, so a substantial body of
law exists on how the rule should operate in that setting. The
rule has been extended to aquifer-stream relationships more
recently, and there is less certainty about how it should apply
to some issues that have arisen occasionally between competing
stream users but are likely to arise more often or more
dramatically in aquifer-stream disputes. The focus below is on
those issues.
2. Delayed impact of pumping. Among appropriators located
on a stream, a junior appropriator's upstream diversion (or
cessation of diversion) typically will affect senior
appropriators downstream fairly quickly. In contrast, when a
junior appropriator pumps (or quits pumping) groundwater, the
impact on a connected stream that serves senior appropriators
will be delayed for some time unless the well is close to the
stream. How should the priority rule be applied when the impact
of pumping (or ceasing to pump) is long delayed?
a. Anticipatory closure of junior wells. One of the few
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cases on time lag is an early Nebraska case that involved stream
appropriators. In State ex rel. carv v. Cochran, 138 Neb. 163,
292 N.W. 239 (1940), the senior appropriators were located about
250 miles downstream from junior appropriators. Ten days would
elapse between diversion by the juniors and a reduction in the
flow downstream for the seniors. The seniors wanted the juniors
shut down whenever the flow upstream at the junior points of
diversion dropped so that the seniors expected a shortage to
develop downstream 10 days later. The court ruled, however, that
the seniors could not have the juniors shut down until there was
an actual shortage downstream. The court said a shortage that
the seniors merely anticipated might in fact never occur because
streamf low data used to make the projection were not very good or
because weather changes in the next 10 days, such as cooler
temperatures or rainstorms, might decrease the need to divert
water or increase the water supply. And the court said that if
an expected shortage should not materialize, anticipatory closure
of upstream junior diversions would turn out to be a waste of
public waters.
Cochran involved competing appropriators on a stream and a
time lag of 10 days. In aquifer-stream cases, the time lag is
often much longer, measured not in days or perhaps even in weeks
but in years. Another difference with aquifer-stream cases is
that if junior wells are shut off, groundwater storage will not
always go to waste as the streamf low in Cochran would have.
A Colorado case deals with anticipatory closure of juniors
in the stream-aquifer context. The case arose when the state
engineer adopted rules limiting withdrawals from junior wells "in
time of shortage or projected shortage" for senior stream
appropriators. The rules dealt with time lag of up to 75 days
and authorized closure of junior wells for up to 3 days per week.
The rules were to be effective only for a defined period that
expired before the court decided the case. Nonetheless, the
Colorado Supreme Court reviewed the rules and upheld them,
rejecting An argument by junior well owners that an intervening
storm might cure streamf low shortage. Kuioer v. Well Owners 
Conservation Association, 176 Colo. 119, 490 P.2d 268, 280-81
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(1971), overruled as to another ...int by Mamosa-iallara Water
	 cm
UserS Protectiv , Association, 674 P.24 814 (Colo. 1983).
Arguably, the decision is limited by the court's Statement that
even if a storm should occur and relieve the streamf low shortage,
water left in the aquifer by wells that were shut down would not
go to waste because it could be pumped by other wells or be taken
by junior stream appropriators Who would otherwise go Without.
b. Selecting iUniors to shut down. Water administrators
have not always applied the priority rule mechanically even on
streams. Elwood Mead (Irrigation Institutions 166 (1903))
described the early administration of streams as follows:
In theory the last appropriator should be the first to
be cut off, but in practice it often happens that this
appropriator is fifty or one hundred miles away, while
another appropriator, inferior to the one seeking
relief, is near at hand. To wait for water to come
from turning off the last appropriator might cause the
loss of crops, and in practice it is often the junior
appropriator who can be first reached whose water-
supply is curtailed. 	
(Th
In 1969, the Colorado Supreme Court held that a water
administrator who shut down 39 wells out of 1600 to satisfy
senior surface rights acted arbitrarily in selecting wells for
closure and thus violated equal protection of the laws.
PellhaUer v. People, 167 Colo. 320, 447 P.2d 986 (1969). The
court ruled that administrative closure of wells must proceed
under reasonable regulations adopted prior to issuance of closure
orders. The Colorado legislature then authorized the state
engineer to adopt such regulations "to assist in, but not as a
prerequisite to" the administration of water rights. Colo. Rev. 
Stat. Ann. ,S 37-92-501(1) (Supp. 1991).	 .
c. Overlong delay/. Can the time lag between groundwater
pumping and a reduced streamf low ever become so long that the law
will ignore the physical connection? The Colorado Supreme Court
took up this question in a series of cases decided in the 1970$.
District 10 Water Users Ass'n v. Barnett, 198 Colo. 291, 599 P.2d
894 (1979); Euiper.V. LUndvali, 187 Colo. 40 1 529 P.2d 1328
(1974); Hall v. Kuiver, 181 'Colo. 130, 510 P.2d 329 (1913). The
court ruled that groundwater is tributary to a stream, and thus
is subject to stream priorities, though the time lag is 40 years.
But the court also said that groundwater is not subject to senior
stream priorities when the time lag exceeds 100 years because
then the tributary connection is de minimis. The court left open
how to treat time lag of 40 to 100 years.
Later, the Colorado legislature adopted the 100-year cutoff
but modified it with a further de minimis limitation. The
legislature declared that groundwater located outside designated
basins should be treated as nontributary if pumping it will not
deplete streamf low in 100 years at an annual rate greater than
one-tenth of one percent of the annual rate of withdrawal. And
in four named aquifers, the legislature required this depletion
test to be applied under an assumed hydrostatic pressure level
that meant more groundwater was deemed nontributary than if the
test were applied under the actual pressure level. Colo. Rev. 
Stat. Ann. S 37-90-103(10.5) (1990); see also id. S 37-90-
137(9)(c) (1990) (new withdrawals of "not nontributary" water in
the four aquifers require a judicially approved plan for
streamf low augmentation).
3. Attenuated impact of Dumoing. The pumping of ground-
water tributary to a stream does not necessarily reduce the
streamf low by an equal amount. Some of the water pumped might
have been lost to the system even if it were not pumped, e.g.,
losses through springs or evapotranspiration. Also, if
groundwater is pumped only during summer months, any reduction of
streamf low might be spread throughout the year so that the
reduction is less per month than the monthly withdrawals of
groundwater. Thus, the effect of groundwater pumping on
streamf low might be either inconsequential or incommensurate to
the groundwater pumped.
a. Inconsequential impact. In disputes between stream
appropriators, the courts have long held that a senior appropri-
ator can prevent a junior appropriator from taking water only if
the junior's diversion materially interferes with the senior's
right. See W. Hutchins, Selected Problems in the Law of Water
rights in the West 335 (1942). One can expect the same rule to
apply to aquifer-stream cases.
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Colorado has codified the material-injury rule. gPlo. 
Rev. Stat. Ann. SS 37-90-137(2) (permit applications for wells
outside designated basins), 37-92-501(1), -502(2) (administration
of priorities) (1990). Colorado cases provide some examples of
what might constitute material injury. In Danielson V. Jones,
698 P.2d 240 (Colo. 1985), a well owner wanted to pump an
additional 12.5 gallons per minute from a well that tapped an
aquifer tributary to an overappropriated stream system. The
court ruled that the new pumping would materially interfere with
senior rights, noting that with continuous pumping the depletion
would total 20 acre-feet annually. In Giffen v. Jones, 690 P.2d
1244, 1246 n.3 (Colo. 1984), the court noted but did not rule on
a finding by the state engineer that a groundwater withdrawal of
2 acre-feet per year proposed by Giffen would materially injure
senior appropriators, and it mentioned that Giffen apparently
assumed that even a withdrawal of 0.2 acre-feet per year would
cause material injury. See also Pueblo West Metropolitan
District v. Southeastern Colorado Water Conservancy District, 717
P.2d 955 (Colo. 1986) (material injury must be determined on a
case-by-case basis); Danielson v. Kerbs. Inc., 646 P.2d 362
(Colo. 1982) (arguably equating the concepts of material injury
and unreasonable impairment).
b. Incommensurate impact. The traditional rule on
streams has been that despite incommensurate impact, a senior
appropriator can close a junior diversion if that will make water
available to the senior in usable quantities when the senior
needs it. E.g., State ex rel. Cary v. Cochran, supra. A few
states have modified this rule by statute for groundwater. La.,
Wvo. Stat. S 41-3-915(a)(iv) (1977) (state engineer may impose a
rotation system in groundwater control areas rather than strictly
enforcing priorities if such enforcement would "not result in
proportionate benefits to senior appropriators"); see also Colo. 
Rev. Stat. Ann. S 37-90-103(10.5) (treatment of groundwater as
nontributary), supra p. 5.
4. Inadequate data and the burden of proof 
	
(Th
a. New appropriations. Most appropriation doctrine
states require a permit to appropriate water and allow a permit
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to issue only if unappropriated water exists. A permit applicant
usually is said to have the burden of proving that unappropriated
water exists. Even so, agencies and courts interested in pro-
moting new water development often have resolved factual doubts
in the applicant's favor. See. e.g.. Little Cottonwood water Co. 
v. Sandy City, 123 Utah 242, 258 P.2d 440 (1953). Their reason-
ing has been that no harm will result if too many permits are
issued because the priority rule will still protect senior
appropriators if the water supply turns out to be inadequate.
This reasoning is inappropriate with permit applications to
appropriate groundwater. As a result of time lag between new
pumping and impact on streamf low, overuse of the water supply
might not become apparent for years and then closing the junior
wells might not restore the supply to senior stream appropriators
for years after that.
In a departure from the traditional approach to issuing
permits, the Idaho Supreme Court upheld the state engineer's
decision to close much of a groundwater basin to new
appropriations for lack of unappropriated water. There were
conflicting studies on the groundwater supply, some of which
indicated that unappropriated water was available. But the court
accepted the state engineer's decision to take a cautious view
and rely instead on those studies indicating that no
unappropriated water was available. State ex rel. TApnan V. 
Smith, 92 Idaho 451, 444 P.2d 412 (1968).
b. Enforcement of nriorities between existing approDri-
ators. According to a 1970 report, state water administrators
often have been reluctant to enforce the priority rule against
junior groundwater users. Their reluctance was said to stem from
"either of two reasonable doubts: that the available facts would
suffice to sustain them against any appeal from an order for
reduction, or that the statutory procedure would in fact
recapture the status of the earlier appropriators." William C.
Walton, Groundwater Resource Evaluation 622 (1970). See also
Wyoming State Engineer v. Willadsen, 792 P.2d 1376 (Wyo. 1990)
(owners of a stream appropriation had the burden of proving by a
preponderance of the evidence that a junior well interfered with
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their right, and they failed to carry this burden).
Colorado took a different approach in Aanatt=
Users Protection Association v. Gould, 674 P.28 914 (Colo. 1983).
The court approved regulations designed to curtail groundwater
diversions in the San Luis Valley unless well owners individually
Could prove their wells did not materially injure senior rights
or could provide substitute supplies to seniors. The record
showed that streams in the valley were overappropriated and that
groundwater diversions significantly affected streamf low. In
these circumstances, the court said "it may be presumed that eadh
underground diversion materially injures senior appropriators.
The state engineer, therefore, will not be required to repeat for
every well curtailed the painstaking analysis which led to the
aquifer-wide determination of material injury." 674 P.2d at 931.
5. Coning with enforcement of priorities. When there is
long time lag between groundwater pumping and impact on a stream,
overuse of the water supply might continue for years before its
full extent is realized. When the problem finally becomes acute,
enforcement of the priority rule will operate mainly against
aquifer appropriators because stream appropriations generally
predate aquifer appropriations. The closing of numerous wells
under the priority rule can seriously harm communities with
economies based on agricultural use of aquifer water.
Colorado has been a leader in trying to find ways to avoid
or reduce that harm. In Gould, suora, the Colorado Supreme Court
relied on a state policy of promoting maximum water utilization
to suggest that in some instances, which the court did not
define, senior appropriators might have to drill wells to
supplement or replace their surface diversions before being able
to shut down junior wells. The court left open whether junior
well owners should have to pay for the changes in the seniors'
diversion methods. In addition, Colorado has a statute declaring
that "(ijf a well has been approved as an alternate means of
diversion for a water right for which a surface means of
diversion is decreed, such well and such surface means must be
utilized to the extent feasible and permissible . . . to satisfy




	 ordered discontinued." Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. S 37-92-502 (1990).
Finally, some agricultural communities in Colorado dependent on
aquifer water have devised imaginative streamf low augmentation,
water supply substitution, or groundwater recharge programs that
enable continued pumping without depriving senior appropriators
of water. See MacDonnell, supra.
III. Aguifer Recharge
A. Protection of Natural Recharge Areas 
1. Urbanization can reduce natural recharge due to the
covering of permeable soil with buildings, roads, and parking
lots; the building of sewers that accelerate storm water runoff;
and the filling of wetlands.
2. Some states and local governments have land use planning
programs specifically designed to protect natural recharge areas.
See, e.g., Fla. Stat. Ann. SS 163.3177(6)(c) (requiring local
land use plans to indicate ways to provide for aquifer recharge
protection needs), 259.101 (authorizing a state land-acquisition
program to protect water recharge areas) (West 1990, 1991 & Supp.
1992); see also Ketchel v. Bainbridge Township, 52 Ohio St.3d
239, 557 N.E.2d 779 (1990) (protecting recharge areas is a
legitimate objective of minimum lot size zoning), cert. denied,
111 S.Ct. 1073 (1991). The federal wetlands regulations under
the Clean Water Act are well known, but there may even be
municipal regulations protecting wetlands for various purposes,
including aquifer recharge. See. e.g., Manatuck Associates v. 
Town of Fairfield Conservation Commission, No. 26-52-92, 1991 WL
154240 (Conn.Super. July 31, 1991).
B. Artificial Recharge
1. Recharger liability for use of empty underground storage
space. When artificial recharge fills empty underground storage
space with water, is the recharger liable to overlying landowners
for a trespass or a taking of their property?
a. The public-servitude approach. A California court
has ruled that a county water district's recharge program did not
take the property of an overlying landowner, a gravel company, so
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long as the recharge did not raise the water table above its
natural level. The court defined the natural water table as the
level that would have existed without diversions from the
watershed or extractions from the basin. Alameda countv wetev 
District V. Niles Sand and Gravel Co  , 37 Cal.App.3d 924, 112
Cal.Rptr. 846 . (1974), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 869 (1974).
Although the district's recharge program did not raise the
water table above its natural level, the recharge flooded or
contributed to flooding of the gravel company's deep pits. The
gravel company pumped the water from the pits and disposed of it
into the San Francisco Bay. After several years of this, the
gravel company sued the water district, claiming that its
property had been taken. The court rejected the claim on
alternative grounds that both were based on state water law. The
more interesting ground for present purposes relied on the
correlative rights doctrine, which governs percolating ground-
water in California. The court said that this doctrine barred
the gravel company from pumping and wasting the recharge water.
Moreover, the court ruled that the pumping restriction of the
correlative rights doctrine imposed a public servitude on
overlying land, a servitude allowing the water to be under the
land. And since the land was subject to this public servitude,
the gravel pit flooding was not a taking.
The correlative rights doctrine is not widely followed
outside California. It is worth examining whether appropriation
doctrine states could use the public-servitude approach ,. These
states generally allow a person to add imported water to a
stream, use the channel to carry the water closer to the intended
place of use, and then divert an equivalent amount downstream
after allowance for any carriage losses. If the imported water
does not raise the streamf low above the ordinary high water mark
or cause physical damage, such as erosion or siltation of the
channel, the importer violates no right of riparian landowners
Oven if those persons own the stream bed. Pleasant Valley
Irrigation & Power Co. v. Barker, 98 Wash. 459, 462-63, 167 P.
1092, 1093 (1917); see also Blaine County Investment Co. v. Mays,
49 Idaho 766, 774-76, 291 P. 1055, 1058,59 (1930) (stream bed
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ownership not discussed but probably bed was owned by riparian
landowners). In effect, the privately owned stream channel is
subject to a servitude for water flow in the channel, including
the imported water. It would be but a small step for an
appropriation doctrine state to recognize a similar servitude on
the underground storage capacity of land up to the natural water
table, so that a recharger's use of empty storage space up to
that level violates no right of overlying landowners.
b. The no-harm aoproach. In Nebraska, owners of land
overlying an aquifer argued unsuccessfully that a statute
allowing artificial recharge by third persons unconstitutionally
took their exclusive right to the empty storage space under their
lands. They challenged the statute on its face without showing
any harm to their lands. The Nebraska Supreme Court ruled that a
statute cannot unconstitutionally take property unless it
prevents the owner from using the property in a way that the
owner desires or deprives the owner of profit otherwise derivable
from the property. Central Nebraska Public Power and Irriaation
District v. Abrahamson, 226 Neb. 594, 413 N.W.2d 290 (1987).
The challenged statute dealt with incidental recharge from
irrigation, rather than purposeful recharge. Nothing in the
court's opinion, however, suggests that the no-harm rationale
would be inapplicable to purposeful recharge. Moreover, unlike
the public-servitude approach in California, the no-harm approach
would seem to allow recharge that raises the water table higher
than its natural level if no physical damage results. The water
table in Abrahamson, after recharge from the imported irrigation
water, probably was higher than its natural level. The court
spoke of a "large mound" of groundwater created by seepage from
the irrigation project.
The Nebraska court's no-harm rationale has been criticized,
however, for inconsistency with broader "takings" law.
Generally, a statute authorizing the physical invasion of a
person's property, such as a statute requisitioning an empty
warehouse, is a taking of property though the owner is making no
use of it. Joseph L. Sax. Robert H. Abrams. Barton H. Thompson. 
Jr., Teacher's Manual for Legal Control of Water Resources: Cases
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and Uaterials. Second Sdition 134 (1991), 	 PM
c. The no-right apnroach. Appropriation doctrine states
typically assert public ownership of unappropriated water and
allow people to acquire private rights in it only by obtaining is
permit to appropriate from the state. Since an Overlying
landowner has no right except by state Permit to capture Water
under the land, it has been argued that the overlying owner
similarly has no right to exclusive Use of underground Water
storage space without a permit. And without an exclusive right
to the empty space, the overlying owner should have no Plain for
a taking or trespass when a recharger uses the space! ThoreOn,
supra, at 596, 608-09.
2. ReCharger liability for physical damaae. Recharge can
cause physical damage such as impairment of water quality,
impedance of surface drainage, and flooding of mines or lowland
A few states have regulatory statutes intended to avoid such
damage. E.g., Utah Code Ann. S 73-3b-282 (Supp. 1991), Bu t if
physical damage occurs, what legal theories will govern recharger
liability? In some circumstances, statutes may impose liability.
E.a., Neb. Rev, Stat. S 46-241 (1988) (apparently imposing striot
liability for "leakage or overflow" from either snrface or
underground storage).
Often, however, it will be necessary to turn to the common
law. California's public-servitude approach would seem to
relieve a recharger from common law liability, except perhaps far
water quality impairment, if the water table is not raised above
its natural level. Aside from whatever immunity exists under
that approach, the potential common law theories for determining
recharger liability might include negligence, trespass, nUiPanO04,
or strict liability. These theories have been used to determine
liability for the escape of water stored on the surface. One
can expect courts to look to cases on escaping surface water as
possible analogies. There is a difference, however, between
damage from the escape of stored surface water and damage from
artificial recharge. Recharge that caUPeS claMa ge might not be
escaping. Thorson, supra, at 625,-29.
Another complexity can arise in looking to cases on escaping
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surface water. The cases in a given state might take different
approaches to different escaping water situations. For example,
in Idaho one line of cases says that when water escapes from an
artificial channel, such as an irrigation canal, liability for
damage requires a showing of negligence; the non-negligence
theories of trespass, nuisance, and strict liability do not
apply. Another line of cases says that when water overflows
(in effect, escapes from) a natural channel because the defendant
altered or obstructed it, liability is not limited to negligence
but can be based on a non-negligence theory. The two lines of
cases came into seeming conflict in a recent federal court suit
for the flooding of land. A power company had imported water and
stored it in a lake for use in generating electricity and
supplying irrigators. During unusually heavy spring run off, the
power company intentionally discharged some of the artificial
storage into a natural stream channel and thereby flooded
downstream land. On appeal from dismissal of the suit, the Ninth
Circuit was unsure about which line of Idaho cases to apply.
Should it apply the first line because the water was artificially
stored, or the second line because the overflow was from a
natural channel?
The Ninth Circuit referred the question to the Idaho Supreme
Court. The Idaho court reasoned that canal operators are liable
for escaping water only if they are negligent because of the
importance of irrigation to the state and the need to promote it.
The court decided that the same policy should extend to the
operators of "artificial water diversion and storage systems,
i.e., dams and reservoirs which supply the water to the
irrigation canals." Kunz v. Utah Power & Light Co., 117 Idaho
901, 904, 792 p.2d 926, 929 (1990). Thus, the court found that
the line of cases using non-negligence liability theories for
water overflowing natural channels was not analogous.
Besides showing that the proper analogy might not always be
apparent (at least it was not apparent to the Ninth Circuit),
Kunz is interesting for another reason. It would support an
argument in Idaho that liability for damage from artificial
groundwater storage requires a showing of negligence, at least if
13
some of the recharge water will supply irrigators.
3. Competing rechargers. If several persons want to use
the same empty storage space for recharge, which one prevails?
a. Legislatures have seldom authorized specific recharge
projects. But where a legislature does so, as in Idaho Code S
42-4201 (1990), the authorized project presumably should prevail
over any competing project that someone might propose.
b. Statutes in some states require a permit to obtain a
water right for recharge use and allow a permit to issue only if
a state agency determines that the proposed project will be in
the public interest. E.g., Ariz. Rev. Stat. SS 45-151 to -153
(1987); Idaho Code S 42-4201A (1990); Or. Rev. Stat. Ann. S
537.135 (1988). These statutes establish machinery for resolving
some cases of competition over the use of empty storage space.
The state agency, however, still must give specific substantive
content to the public interest concept.
c. Commentators have suggested ways to resolve conflict
over the use of storage space, e.g., priority in time should give
priority in right, or public recharge projects should have
priority over private projects. Corker, supra, at 184-85;
Thorson, supra at 621-24.
4. Recharaer's right to control stored water. Can a
recharger withdraw the stored water for use or at least decide
who gets to withdraw it and on what terms?
a. The San Fernando Valley cases. Los Angeles has long
imported water into the San Fernando Valley. The city has put
part of the imported water on porous spreading grounds so that it
sinks and flows underground down the valley until it reaches the
city's diversion works. Before urbanization took over the
valley, the city sold the rest of the imported water to farmers
for irrigation; and as the city expected, 27 1/2 percent of that
water sank beneath the surface and flowed down the basin to the
city's diversion works. In 1943, the California Supreme Court
ruled that Los Angeles had the exclusive right to withdraw the
water. City of Los Angeles V. City of Glendale, 23 Ca1.2d 68, 	 CM
142 P.2d 289 (1943).
The court said that the city did not abandon its right to
14
the imported water when it used the underground basin to
transport and store the water. The court drew an analogy to
state law allowing a water importer to use a stream bed to
transport the water economically , to the place of use, rather than
have to build a canal system. The court stated:
It would be as harsh to compel plaintiff [Los Angeles]
to build reservoirs when natural ones were available as
to compel the construction of an artificial ditch
beside a stream bed. . . . [I]n selling water to the
farmers, as in spreading water, plaintiff was
interested in its economical transportation and
storage. . . . The use by others of this water as it
flowed to the subterranean basin does not cut off
plaintiff's rights. . . .Once within the basin, en
route to plaintiff's diversion works, [the water) was
in effect within plaintiff's reservoir.
Id. 23 Ca1.2d at 76-78, 142 P.2d at 294-95 (1943).
The California Supreme Court revisited the recharge issue
three decades later. By then, the valley farmland had become
largely urbanized, and indirect recharge from Los Angeles' sale
rEN	 of imported water to farmers had declined. But return flow from
water that the city delivered to urban customers had become a
major new source of indirect recharge. The court reaffirmed the
city's exclusive right to withdraw and use water that its
recharge activities added to the underground basin. As for the
new indirect recharge, the court said that the city was entitled
to it without having to show intent to recapture prior to
importation. No showing of intent prior to importation was
needed because both the city's water deliveries to customers and
its later withdrawals happened within the city limits, so that
both were, in the language of Glendale, "within plaintiff's
reservoir." City of Los Angeles v. City of San Fernando, 14
Ca1.3d 199, 537 P.2d 1250, 1294, 123 Cal.Rptr. 1, 45 (1975).
The court seemed to base some details of the recapture right
on the city's status as a public entity. See Gleason, sutra, at
647. But the court also relied partly on the desirability of
giving an importer the fruits of its efforts and enabling
(Th	 economical storage and transportation of water. This rationale
should support an extensive recapture right in a private
importer/recharger. See Thorson, supra, at 620.
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b. Statutes on control of stored water. Some western
states have statutes that deal explicitly with rights to recharge
water after it has been introduced into the ground. A sampling
of different approaches follows.
In Washington, one who creates artificial storage in a
designated groundwater area or subarea can file a declaration of
ownership with a state agency. Wash. Rev. Code Ann. S 90.44.130
(Supp. 1992). Once the agency accepts the declaration, the
artificial storage is not treated as public water available for
use by others under the regular appropriation doctrine rules.
Using this procedure, the Bureau Of Reclamation established
its right to artificial storage in the Quincy groundwater
subarea. The storage came from downward percolation of water
that the Bureau imported and distributed on the surface to
irrigators. State regulations require that anyone wishing to
pump artificial storage from the Quincy shallow management unit
must have both a withdrawal permit from the state and a contract
with the Bureau. Wash. Admin, Code S 173-143A-080 (1990). The
Bureau charges a fee to contract users. In Jensen v. Department
of Ecology, 102 Wash.2d 109, 685 P.2d 1068 (1984), a person
sought to appropriate artificial storage without the Bureau's
consent. He argued the Bureau had abandoned the water. The
court ruled that there was no abandonment because the Bureau
intended to recapture the water from the outset of the irrigation
water supply project. The court also rejected the notion that
is -when artificial recharge is commingled with naturally occurring
groundwater, it loses its identity and becomes public water. See,
also Flint v. United States, 906 F.2d 471 (9th Cir. 1990)
(upholding charges assessed by the Bureau on farmers using
artificially stored groundwater under contract).
Idaho authorizes recharge districts and irrigation districts
to build recharge facilities and appropriate water for recharge.
Idaho Code SS 42-4201 to -4231 (1990). By statutory declaration,
the underground storage is treated as a beneficial use that will
support an appropriation by a district. The district does not
control the later withdrawal of recharge water. Anyone can
appropriate it within district boundaries under regular state
(Th
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water law. But the district can levy assessments on district
members to pay operation and maintenance expenses and to repay
debt incurred to build recharge facilities.
In Nebraska, legislation allows an intentional recharger to
obtain a permit for storage and recovery. The legislation, which
is hardly a model of clarity, states also that a recovery permit
can issue to a person who is "an appropriator of record . . .
[with] sufficient interest in the underground water storage
facility to entitle the applicant to the water requested." The
statute does not define what is a "sufficient interest," but
apparently persons other than the recharger might be able to
obtain recovery permits. The recharger can levy a reasonable fee
for withdrawals. Neb. Rev. Stat. SS 46-233, -240, -241, -242, -
295, -296, -299 to -2,106 (1988 & Supp. 1990, 1991).
Nebraska also has legislation on incidental, as dis-
tinguished from intentional, recharge. Incidental recharge is
defined as storage that occurs indirectly as a result of other
water use, such as storage due to canal seepage and downward
‘, percolation from irrigated lands. The provisions on incidental
'Nrecharge seem strange until one understands a problem they were
intended to solve. Increasingly, irrigators who had received
water under contract from irrigation districts were abandoning
their surface water contracts and installing wells. They were
able to pump groundwater economically because recharge to the
aquifer from surface irrigation raised the water table. But the
decreasing use of surface water for irrigation put the irrigation
districts at risk of partial cancellation of their surface water
rights for nonuse. See Leroy W. Orton, Legal Recognition of
Rights to Ground Water Stored Incidently Beneath a Surface
Irrigation Project - Nebraska's Legal Exneriment in Water 
Resources Law 84, 85-86 (Proceedings of the National Symposium on
Water Resources Law, American Society of Civil Engineers, 1986).
The legislation addressing this situation allows a surface
water appropriator, like an irrigation district, to apply for and
obtain recognition from the state of incidental underground water
storage arising from its appropriation. Neb. Rev. Stat. SS 46-
226.01, -.02, -295, -296 (1988 & Supp. 1990). The legislation
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says nothing about the surface water appropriator having any
• right to recover the incidental storage. Apparently, overlying
landowners can withdraw the storage pursuant to regular state
groundwater law. Orton, supra, at 89-91; pee Central Nebraska 
Public Power and Irrigation District, 226 Neb. 594, 413 N.W.26
290, 301 (1987). But incidental storage is declared by statute
to be a beneficial use, and the state's recognition of incidental
storage benefits associated with a particular surface water
appropriation should avoid partial cancellation of that
appropriation for nonuse.
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